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ABSTRACT
Web 2.0 applications allow individuals to manage their con-
tent online and to share it with other users and services on
the Web. Such sharing requires access control to be put in
place. Existing access control solutions, however, are un-
satisfactory as they do not offer the functionality that users
need in the open and user-driven Web environment. Addi-
tionally, such solutions are often custom-built and require
substantial development effort, or use existing frameworks
that provide benefits to developers only.
New proposals such as User-Managed Access (UMA) show
a promising solution to authorization for Web 2.0 appli-
cations. UMA puts the end user in charge of assigning
access rights to Web resources. It allows users to share
data more selectively using centralized authorization sys-
tems which make access decisions based on user instructions.
In this paper, we present the UMA/j framework which im-
plements the UMA protocol and allows users of Web appli-
cations to use their preferred authorization mechanisms. It
also supports developers in building access control for their
Web 2.0 applications by providing ready-to-use components
that can be integrated with minimum effort.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.11 [Software]: Software Architectures—Service-oriented
Architecture (SOA)
General Terms
Security, Design
Keywords
access control, security, Web applications, middleware
1. INTRODUCTION
Web 2.0 technologies have enabled applications to provide
a rich and dynamic user experience and expanded function-
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ality. Individuals use such applications as Facebook and
Flickr to manage their data online and to share it with other
users and services on the Web. To maintain privacy and en-
sure that data is shared in a secure fashion, access control
and authorization mechanisms need to be put in place and
integrated with Web applications.
Most existing authorization solutions, however, are ill-
suited to the user-driven Web 2.0 environment, as they are
tightly bound to applications and have limited flexibility in
terms of their configuration or adaptation to a particular
user’s security requirements [15] [17]. For example, existing
applications have different and non-reusable sharing options
or do not even allow to share data selectively outside of the
application itself.
Moreover, access control mechanisms are often custom-
built by software developers for each application separately.
This requires significant effort, tends to be error prone, and
results in business logic being mixed with access control
functionality. Existing authorization frameworks alleviate
this problem only partially since they require developers to
define static policies in local configuration files without pro-
viding flexible and usable access control for the end user.
Following the highly collaborative Web 2.0 paradigm, there
is a clear need for new approaches to access management
where the user plays a central role in the model. Such ap-
proaches would allow a user to be in full control of assigning
access rights to their Web resources while retaining all the
benefits of social interactions and data sharing that Web 2.0
provides. Moreover, these mechanisms would not require
significant effort from software developers but would rely on
ready-to-use and loosely coupled components.
The recently proposed User-Managed Access (UMA) pro-
tocol [6] is a new proposal to access control for the openWeb.
UMA puts the user in charge of assigning access rights to
resources that may be hosted at various Web applications.
UMA facilitates the ability of users to share data more selec-
tively using centralized systems, called authorization man-
agers, which make access decisions based on user instruc-
tions. Web applications do not have to implement access
control, but they delegate it to these systems, concerning
themselves only with enforcing access control decisions.
In this paper we discuss UMA/j, the first known frame-
work to provide Web applications with support for the UMA
protocol. Our solution allows Web applications to delegate
access control to users’ preferred authorization managers.
Therefore, these users can protect their online resources with
their preferred access control mechanisms. By putting the
user in charge of managing the delegation process, UMA/j
fits precisely into the user-driven Web 2.0 environment.
UMA/j differs significantly from existing proposals to ac-
cess control for the Web. It supports establishing relation-
ships between parties of the UMA protocol dynamically.
It also does not rely on access control policies defined by
developers in local configuration files at Web applications.
Rather, policies are managed by the users of these applica-
tions whom the policies directly benefit. Moreover, UMA/j
supports dynamic resource registration allowing users to de-
fine which of their resources are meant to be protected in
due course. As such, it supports access control delegation in
a flexible and entirely user-driven manner.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Users create and manage their data using Web 2.0 appli-
cations and disseminate and share this data with other users
and services on the Web. Despite the fact that users now
play a pivotal role in various online interactions, they are
not sufficiently empowered to control access to their Web
resources. This is mostly due to applications implement-
ing simple isolated authorization models that are ill-suited
for the open Web and fail to provide the required level of
flexibility and simplicity, such as that discussed in [18].
Existing authorization systems based on such models re-
quire end users to manage their access control using differ-
ent management tools provided by Web applications which
results in an inconsistent user experience (UX). Moreover,
underlying policies often differ and are incompatible with
each other, thus they cannot be easily reused for distributed
Web resources. For example, a user cannot create a single
policy to share data with the same set of family members
and apply this policy to photos at Facebook and Flickr.
Moreover, access control is implemented individually at
each Web application, thus users need to manage authoriza-
tion settings separately and are required to traverse Web
applications to configure these settings. This problem also
applies to auditing and monitoring sharing and limits the
view of the applied security over distributed resources [12].
Access control solutions tend to be problematic from the
perspective of Web application development as well. Exist-
ing solutions are either custom-built or are based on such
frameworks as ESAPI [4], Spring Security [5] or OpenSSO
[3]. Custom-built solutions require tight coupling of ac-
cess control with the application itself, resulting in business
logic being mixed with authorization functionality. Systems
based on authorization frameworks, despite allowing devel-
opers to reuse provided components, require substantial ef-
fort to expose access control (in order to provide sharing
functionality) to end users. Moreover, developed user inter-
faces (UI) often satisfy requirements of a particular group
of users only. For example, a UI with various sharing op-
tions may be suitable for advanced users but too complex
for others.
Proposals for delegated authorization, such as those based
on XACML [8], which is well-supported by various imple-
mentations, allow to use a centralized system for access con-
trol to distributed resources. Such proposals, however, do
not fully alleviate the problem of access control for the open
and user-driven Web 2.0 environment. These proposals are
mainly targeted at internally deployed Web systems with
well-defined points of control. They require relationships
between applications of the system to be configured by de-
velopers and do not grant the end user full control over as-
signing access rights to their resources. For example, in
OpenSSO, applications have to be integrated with a central
authorization server during their deployment and it is the
policy administrator and not the end user who is responsible
for defining access rights to Web resources.
3. USER-MANAGED ACCESS
User-Managed Access proposes a solution to authorization
for Web resources that responds to security and privacy chal-
lenges in the Web 2.0 environment. It provides a method
for users to control third-party application access to their
protected resources, residing on any number of host sites,
through a centralized authorization manager that makes ac-
cess decisions based on user instructions. This allows a user
to choose the mechanisms that provide the exact function-
ality or UX that a user requires.
3.1 Architecture
UMA has four main entities: Authorizing User, Autho-
rization Manager, Host, and Requester (Fig. 1). An Autho-
rizing User delegates access control from their chosen set
of Hosts to an Authorization Manager (AM) and composes
access control policies at the AM. An Authorization Man-
ager acts on behalf of that user and evaluates access requests
made by Requesters against applicable policies, issuing Ac-
cess Tokens necessary to make authorized access requests to
Protected Resources. A Host is a Web application that is
used by an Authorizing User to store and manage Protected
Resources. It delegates access control to AM. A Requester
is an application, controlled by a person or a company (Re-
questing Party), that interacts with a Host to get access to
a Protected Resource, which can be accomplished after it
interacts with the AM to obtain an Access Token.
For example, a Web user (Authorizing User) can authorize
a Web application (Requester) to gain one-time or ongoing
access to photos stored at Facebook and Flickr (Hosts), by
telling these hosts to act on access decisions made by his
authorization decision-making service (Authorization Man-
ager). The requesting party might be an e-commerce com-
pany whose site is acting on behalf of the user himself to
print selected photos, or it might be his friend who is using
an online photo editing service to retouch photos. We refer
the reader to [7] for other UMA use case scenarios.
3.2 Delegation Protocol
The UMA protocol describes interactions between the pre-
viously defined entities and consists of the following steps:
(1) User introduces host to AM, (2) Requester gets access
token from AM, (3) Requester wields access token at host to
gain access (Fig. 1). For the sake of completeness, we also
describe the dynamic binding step which allows UMA inter-
actions to occur between Web applications that do not have
any pre-established relationships. We also discuss the dy-
namic resource registration step which currently constitutes
an optional step of the UMA protocol. A more detailed
description of the protocol can be found in [6] and [16].
3.2.1 User introduces host to AM
First, a user establishes a trust relationship between a host
and AM. A user provides the location of a preferred AM to a
host. A host then uses the site-meta [20] and host-meta [14]
discovery mechanisms to obtain a metadata document from
the AM defining the location of various endpoints that this
Figure 1: High-level overview of the User-Managed Access protocol [16].
AM exposes, among other information such as supported
access token types [6].
If the user’s chosen AM is unknown to the host, then this
host registers itself dynamically with the AM by providing
necessary information about itself, using the push or pull
host registration model [21]. The host is provisioned in this
fashion with OAuth client credentials {cid,csecret} that are
later used to interact with this AM, regardless of the user
in question.
The host, acting as the OAuth client, then uses the OAuth
V2.0 Web Server Flow to obtain the user’s authorization to
use this AM. This step results in the host being provisioned
with the access token AT host and an optional refresh token
RT host . AT host allows the host to use the AM’s host-specific
endpoints described later in this section. If this token ex-
pires, then the RT host is used to obtain a new AT host .
User registers resources at AM
A host may delegate access control to the AM for all re-
sources of a particular user, for groups of resources or for
individual resources only. The protocol itself allows for ar-
bitrary granularity levels of access control delegation.
A user on a host can select resources and groups of re-
sources that are meant to be policy-protected at the AM.
A host then sends information about these resources to the
AM’s resource registration URL wielding its own AT host .
3.2.2 Requester gets access token from AM
A requester can access a protected resource on a host
only if the access request is accompanied by an access token
AT req . If AT req is missing then a host responds with“HTTP
401 Unauthorized” response that signals how to obtain such
a token from the AM protecting this resource.
A requester can ask for AT req by providing information
to the AM’s access token URL about the required type of
access (method and scope) being sought at a host. The AM
evaluates such a request and responds with a successful ac-
cess response, an unsuccessful access response, or a claims-
requested document. The first one contains the AT req and
an optional refresh token (RT req) while the second one de-
nies authorization. The claims-requested document contains
a list of properties that a requester must prove to posses be-
fore access to a resource can be granted [6].
3.2.3 Requester wields access token at host to gain
access
Once the requester has AT req it can issue an access re-
quest to a protected resource wielding this token. The host
evaluates AT req locally or may use the registered AM for this
resource at run time for the evaluation process. In the lat-
ter case, the host sends AT req to the AM’s token validation
URL wielding its own AT host and awaits decision whether
access to the resource should be granted or not.
4. UMA/J FRAMEWORK
UMA/j is the first known framework to provideWeb appli-
cations with support for the User-Managed Access protocol,
with a few extensions proposed by the authors. This frame-
work can be integrated with new and existing Web applica-
tions to allow these applications to become UMA-compliant
hosts capable of delegating access control to users’ chosen
authorization managers.
4.1 Design
UMA/j consists of the following modules: Discovery, Dy-
namic Registration, Host Introduction, Resource Registra-
tion, Token Validation, Request Filter and Core modules
(Fig. 2). The Web application can use the framework
through its UMA API exposed by the Core module which
hides complexities of lower-level APIs of individual compo-
nents. The application, however, can use low-level APIs as
well in case more fine-grained control over authorization del-
egation is required.
4.1.1 Discovery
The discovery module implements the site-meta [20] and
host-meta [14] discovery, which allows the application to ob-
tain information about services provided by a user’s chosen
AM. It consumes the XRD document [10] that describes the
locations of these services (endpoints) and the AM’s sup-
ported access token formats, among other information. Ac-
quired information is later consumed by the Core module
and is available to other UMA/j components.
4.1.2 Dynamic Registration
The dynamic registration module allows the application
to receive required OAuth client credentials {cid,csecret}
Figure 2: Design of the UMA/j framework and its integration with a Web application.
that the application must use when establishing a trust re-
lationship with the AM (recall step (1) of the UMA proto-
col). This involves providing the AM with information about
the application, i.e. its name, description, address, redirect
URL, and icon. The AM displays such information to the
user when asking for authorization of this trust relationship.
Dynamic registration is performed according to models
defined in [21], where the host pushes the information to the
AM (push model) or where the AM discovers information
directly from the host (pull model). We extend the pull
model by allowing the AM to respond with a nonce which
the host must place into its description file (e.g. XRD). The
AM then retrieves this file from the host’s discovery URL
and verifies its validity.
In the pull registration model, the AM has more flexibil-
ity in determining the trustworthiness of a Web application
because its description is retrieved from an authoritative
source. For example, the AM may use HTTPS to retrieve
information and may check if the domain in the obtained
SSL certificate matches that from the descriptor file. The
nonce is included in the file to ensure that it’s the actual
application that provisions this description.
This module then retrieves {cid,csecret}. These creden-
tials are retrieved only once for each host-AM pair and are
reused among different users of the same application (a user
of the application never learns the csecret).
Our framework supports all aspects of dynamic registra-
tion based on the application’s configuration provided by the
developer. In case of the pull model, for example, UMA/j
provides an endpoint that handles host discovery by the AM.
4.1.3 Host Introduction
The host introduction process in UMA is based on the
OAuth V2.0 Web Server Flow [11]. The UMA/j framework
supports this step of the protocol with a custom-built OAuth
V2.0 library [2] that integrates with other modules of the
framework and can be also used as a standalone library.
This module allows the application to communicate with
the AM using {cid,csecret} in order to receive the AT host .
This token allows the application to use the AM to register
resources which should be protected and to validate AT req
tokens received from requesters.
Our OAuth V2.0 library is capable of receiving both access
tokens (AT host) and refresh tokens (RT host) as defined in
[11]. When a particular AT host is no longer valid for the
AM, then a corresponding RT host is used to obtain a new
AT host . UMA/j supports this process in a transparent way
to the application.
4.1.4 Resource Registration
As discussed earlier, a host may delegate access control to
the AM for all resources of a particular user, for groups of
resources or for individual resources only. UMA/j supports
all three granularity levels of access control delegation.
Typically, an application would protect all resources of
a particular user at this user’s preferred AM. In more ad-
vanced settings, once a user introduces an application to
the AM they are able to select which resources must be pro-
tected in due course. For example, a user registers his online
photo service with his chosen AM and then selects individ-
ual albums or photos that require protection, among others
that require none. UMA/j supports this by allowing the
application to communicate information about resources to
the AM, including information about resource location and
associated metadata (e.g. resource’s groups). Such infor-
mation can then be used when a user defines access control
policies at the AM.
Web applications can register arbitrary resources that can
be identified by URIs as required by UMA. Our framework
extends this by allowing arbitrary grouping of resources and
protecting such groups by AMs. It is the responsibility of
a developer, however, to define these groups for our frame-
work. For example, an online gallery service could group
photos in albums or allow grouping of individual photos
based on user-supplied tags.
4.1.5 Request Filter
UMA/j provides a generic mechanism for filtering requests
to Web resources that is based on Servlet Filters [1]. The
request filter checks HTTP requests and detects those that
are issued to UMA-protected resources. Information about
whether a resource is UMA-protected and regarding the re-
source’s group is provided by the Core module.
When the resource is protected but the required AT req
is missing then the filter responds with a standard “HTTP
401 Unauthorized” response and includes information about
the AM that protects this resource. However, if AT req is
detected, then the filter passes the request to the core mod-
ule which uses the token validation component for further
processing.
4.1.6 Token Validation
This component supports both local and remote valida-
tion of AT req received by a host from a requester, which is
first processed by the Request Filter. The UMA protocol
itself does not restrict the token format to be used, so this
module can work with different token types.
Local validation is performed by plugins responsible for
different token types. By default, the framework supports
validation of SWT tokens [9] by checking the token’s issuer
(i.e. if it’s the AM registered by a user) and matching its
properties against requested access type. UMA/j also sup-
ports the inclusion of custom plugins for other token types.
Remote token validation is performed by sending a JSON-
formatted access decision request to the registered AM. This
request describes the access request issued by a requester
(i.e. AT req , scope, HTTP method) and has a host’s AT host
attached to it. This request may also include additional in-
formation. Our framework, for example, includes informa-
tion about token usage in access decision requests to provide
support for one-time tokens.
4.1.7 Core
This module aims to (1) allow the application to use UMA
functionality, (2) provide services for all UMA/j compo-
nents, and (3) expose an abstraction of persistent storage
of UMA-related data to these components. As such, it glues
all the modules together and ensures that their functionali-
ties comply with the UMA protocol.
The Core module hides the complexity of using separate
UMA/j components by exposing a high-level UMA API.
Firstly, this API allows the application to delegate access
control to users’ preferred AMs. Secondly, it allows to reg-
ister resources that are meant to be protected. The frame-
work then takes care of underlying steps (e.g. discovery and
dynamic registration in the host introduction process).
This module provides services for other UMA/j compo-
nents by providing them with the required data and ensuring
that such data is passed correctly as necessary. For example,
it passes discovered information about endpoints to all mod-
ules or provisions the correct AT host to resource registration
and token validation modules (in case remote validation is
necessary). Moreover, it ensures that all UMA-related data
remains in a consistent state for separate components.
The Core module provides an interface for persistent stor-
age of all UMA-related data which includes endpoint de-
scriptions, credentials, and access and refresh tokens for dif-
ferent AMs (possibly used by different users of the same Web
application). This information is then used by the Web ap-
plication and other modules of the framework. We depend,
however, on the developer to provide a concrete implemen-
tation of this interface (e.g. a developer can decide to store
UMA-related data in a file or using a database).
4.2 Implementation
UMA/j has been implemented in Java according to soft-
ware engineering best practices with design patterns applied
where necessary. Modularity of the framework allows for ad-
justment to different deployment environments and the use
of different components independently. For example, the
OAuth V2.0 module can be used as a standalone library.
Moreover, UMA/j does not rely on any specific Web frame-
work and can be easily integrated with applications that
conform to the Java Servlet specification [1].
Unit tests have been provided for individual components
and the framework’s compliance with the UMA protocol has
been verified using integration tests. UMA/j is planned to
be released as an open-source project.
4.3 Evaluation
UMA/j has been evaluated empirically from the perspec-
tive of Web application developers as well as end users of
these applications. At this stage of development, we have
not yet conducted any performance or scalability tests of the
proposed framework.
To test UMA/j empirically, we implemented two proto-
type Web applications, an online storage service and an on-
line photo gallery service, that can be deployed to the Google
App Engine (GAE) platform. Both applications provide
user interfaces (UI) and RESTful APIs. The storage service
is based on Java servlets while the gallery service is based on
the Spring MVC framework. RESTful APIs were provided
using Apache CXF. We integrated UMA/j with both ap-
plications and tested using our prototype AM and requester
applications to verify our solution for User-Managed Access.
Integration of UMA/j required minimal programming ef-
fort and changes to configuration files only. Firstly, neces-
sary dependencies were included in the classpath of both
applications. Then, the UMA API was added, separately
from the business logic. Host discovery, OAuth, and request
filtering have been configured by adding these modules to
deployment descriptors of Web applications. The first two
modules were included as a single servlet while the third
module was included as a filter. Configuration for all UMA/j
modules was provided in a Java properties file and included
in WAR files of both applications. UMA functionality was
exposed to the users with a custom UI at each application.
End users of our Web applications were able to use the
provided UI to delegate access control to our prototype AM.
Such delegation had to be set up only once per user per ap-
plication. The user would choose their preferred AM either
from a list of pre-configured AMs or by providing the AM’s
URL. Then, users were able to select which resources should
be UMA-protected and they would define access control poli-
cies for their resources using our prototype AM.
5. RELATED WORK
Delegating access control from Web applications to spe-
cialized components is usually provided in form of middle-
ware or frameworks, with examples such as ESAPI, Spring
Security or OpenSSO. These frameworks partially alleviate
the problem of implementing custom authorization for ap-
plications by providing high-level access control APIs and
allowing policies to be defined in separate configuration files
(or in a central location as in OpenSSO).
These solutions, however, have not been primarily de-
signed for the open and user-driven Web 2.0 environment.
ESAPI and Spring Security provide benefits to developers
only and they are based on access control policies config-
ured for each application separately. OpenSSO, on the other
hand, requires pre-established relationships between appli-
cations and their central access control system. It also lacks
support for discovery of services provided by such systems
and does not allow for dynamic resource registration.
The OAuth V1.0 [13] proposal to access control for Web
services attracted much attention from the Web community.
It allows to share data stored at one service with another ser-
vice without revealing user credentials. Each OAuth service
provider, however, must independently serve an authoriza-
tion management function and users cannot centralize their
access control settings in a single location.
OAuth V2.0 [11] is a less complex attempt to solve the
problem of authorization for Web resources. It allows ap-
plications to delegate authorization to a trusted authority
(Authorization Server) which issues tokens to clients of these
applications. OAuth V2.0, however, fails to provide cer-
tain features required in today’s open Web environment. In
particular, it does not support dynamic introductions by
users and requires relationships between parties to be pre-
established. Therefore, despite logically separating the au-
thorization system from the service hosting data, these two
need to be tightly coupled for the protocol to work.
Kerberos [19] is a well-established protocol that allows to
delegate access control from servers to a centralized system.
Clients first obtain a token from such a system and then
use it to gain access to resources on a server. Kerberos
allows to centralize authorization for various services but
it requires a well-defined point of authority, relationships
between services to be pre-established and relies heavily on
symmetric cryptography. As such, it is ill-fitted for the open
Web environment.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed UMA/j, the first known framework to
provideWeb applications with support for the User-Managed
Access protocol. The framework allows users of Web appli-
cations to delegate access control to their preferred autho-
rization managers. Such delegation can be done dynamically
and does not require pre-established relationships between
these applications and the users’ chosen AMs. Moreover,
users of Web applications can select in due course which of
their resources are meant to be protected by their autho-
rization managers. As such, UMA/j provides access con-
trol delegation in a highly flexible manner, allowing users
of Web applications to use access control mechanisms that
meet their exact requirements and expectations.
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